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In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn the Texas Supreme Court
decided that repetitious mental traumatic activities cannot produce a com-
pensable occupational disease under section 20 of the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act. Notwithstanding the legislature's espoused intention
to liberalize occupational disease coverage via the 1971 amendatory acts,
the court ruled that the 1955 Bailey decision still defines the scope of com-
pensable neuroses; thus only nervous disabilities traceable to a specific
time, place, and cause are eligible for compensation. In requiring an iso-
lated traumatic event to ensure that a claimant's nervous disease is work
related, the court has disregarded the fact that cumulative stress and anxi-
ety can produce disabilities as serious as those precipitated by a sudden
traumatic event. Furthermore, problems in establishing causation are
minimized in cases where the employment environment of disabled claim-
ants revolves entirely about stressful conditions. Since the legislature has
made clear that all occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of
employment are to be compensated, the court should reconsider this issue
and allow each claim to be approached on its individual merits.
Patricia Sonders
Standing to Sue Under Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act:
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood
The Chicago suburb of Bellwood and residents of the village and sur-
rounding areas brought separate actions under section 812 of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968' against two real estate brokerage firms, alleging ra-
cially discriminatory real estate practices in violation of section 804 of the
Act.2 The individual plaintiffs, including both black and white residents of
Bellwood and a black resident of a nearby town, had approached both real
estate firms and expressed an interest in purchasing homes in Bellwood.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976). The text of the statute is set forth at note 46 infra.
2. Id. § 3604 provides:
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
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These individuals were not actually interested in home ownership but were
acting as testers 3 to determine if the brokers were steering home buyers
into segregated neighborhoods on the basis of race. At trial, the village of
Bellwood claimed it had suffered injury in that its housing market had
been wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the economic and social det-
riment of its citizens.4 The individual plaintiffs alleged that, while acting
as testers, they had been denied the right to select housing without regard
to race and, as actual residents, had been deprived of the social and profes-
sional benefits of living in an integrated society.' The district court
granted summary judgment for defendants in both cases, holding that
plaintiffs were not direct victims of the alleged discriminatory practices
and, therefore, were not within the class of persons to whom Congress had
extended the right to sue under section 812 of the Act.6 The court of ap-
peals consolidated the two cases and reversed and remanded, holding that
Congress intended that standing to sue under section 812 of the Act should
be accorded to both direct and indirect victims of discrimination.7 Addi-
tionally the court found that, while individual plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue in their capacity as testers, they were entitled to prove that they, as
residents of the affected community, were indirect victims who had been
harmed by defendants' discrimination.' Held, affirmed in part:9 Passage of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the
neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
3. Claimants were acting as testers in that they were not actually seeking housing;
instead, they pretended to be looking for housing in order to determine whether defendants
were racially steering buyers.
4. The village of Bellwood sued in its corporate capacity. The defendants therefore
argued to the court of appeals that Bellwood lacked standing because it was not a "person"
as defined by § 802(d) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (1976). Village of Bell-
wood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1020 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978). The court rejected this
argument since the Act included a corporation within its definition of "person," and Bell-
wood was a municipal corporation. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, defendants quali-
fied their argument and contended that Bellwood did not have standing because it was not a
private person entitled to sue under § 812. The Court stated that, since the issue was raised
belatedly, the question of whether Bellwood was a private person was not properly before
the Court; therefore, the Court declined to address it.
5. The Supreme Court noted that it was obliged to construe the complaint favorably
since the Court was reviewing the complaint on defendant's motion for summary judgment.
With this express qualification, the Court construed plaintiffs' use of the word "society" as
referring to the harm done specifically to the residents of the Bellwood neighborhood. If the
Court had construed the term more broadly, it might have denied standing since allegations
of generalized harm traditionally have been found insufficient to establish standing.
6. 569 F.2d at 1015.
7. Id. at 1020.
8. Id. at 1019-20.
9. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding of standing as to the individuals
living within Bellwood as well as to the village itself. Nevertheless, the Court reversed the
lower court's grant of standing to those complainants living outside the target area since they
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section 812 indicates an intention by Congress to grant standing to sue to
as broad a class as is permitted under section 810. The allegations by the
individuals residing in the target area of the loss of social and professional
benefits as a result of racial steering, as well as the village of Bellwood's
allegations that it had been robbed of its racial balance and stability, are
sufficient to establish standing to sue. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979).
I. STANDING: CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND PRUDENTIAL
CONCERNS
The purpose of standing is to determine whether the plaintiff is the
proper person to raise the issues in a suit.' In determining whether a liti-
gant has standing, the courts consider both constitutionally imposed limi-
tations and judicially created prudential principles." The constitutional
question is whether the plaintiff has made out a case or controversy be-
tween himself and the defendant within the meaning of article III of the
United States Constitution.12 To establish a constitutionally sufficient case
or controversy, the plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the outcome so
as "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."' 3 The Supreme Court has developed a two-
pronged test to determine if the constitutional limitations have been met."
First, the plaintiff must allege an injury in fact. 5 The injury in fact re-
quirement is satisfied not only by an economic injury" but also by an
aesthetic or recreational injury." Secondly, the injury must be capable of
failed to make sufficient allegations of actual harm. The Court expressly declined to decide
whether individuals who reside outside the target area have standing to sue, but indicated it
might do so if the district court, on remand, allowed the two individuals to amend their
complaints to include allegations of actual harm.
[0. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); see Note, Congressional Access to the
Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1635 (1977).
11. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975); see Comment, Standing to Challenge
Exclusionary Land Use Devices in Federal Courts After Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REV.
323 (1977), which summarizes the constitutional and prudential limitations of standing.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 grants power to the judiciary to hear all cases or
controversies arising under the Constitution: "Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution. . .[and] to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party ...."
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
361 (1911).
14. See Note, supra note 10, at 1635 n.24.
15. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
16. Id.
17. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Court in a four-three decision
written by Justice Stewart ruled that the Sierra Club had not alleged a sufficient injury in
fact as a result of the development of a ski resort in a wilderness area and, therefore, had not
established standing to sue to enjoin the construction of the project. The Court statedthat a
noneconomic injury, such as aesthetic or recreational harm, could give rise to standing, but
found that the Sierra Club failed to allege any such personalized injury. Id. at 734-35. See
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Federal Statutes and Government Regulation, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 50, 234-41 (1972), for a discussion of the Sierra Club's allegations.
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redress by a favorable decision.' 8
In addition to the constitutional limitations on standing, the plaintiff
must satisfy judicially imposed limitations evidencing prudential con-
cerns.' 9 These limitations are an attempt by the judiciary to avoid decid-
ing questions of broad social import when there will be no vindication of
individual rights and to restrict access to the federal courts to those liti-
gants who are best suited to assert a particular claim.2" Such limitations
require that the plaintiff (1) assert an injury peculiar to himself or a distinct
group of which he is a part,2' (2) assert his own legal interests rather than
the interests of third parties, 22 (3) demonstrate that the asserted interest is
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question," 23 and (4) demonstrate that
a causal link exists between the action of the defendant and the harm suf-
fered. 24 These prudential standing rules, however, are not of constitu-
tional magnitude.2' Therefore, courts have developed four major
exceptions that allow the courts to circumvent these rules.26 First, a court
can grant standing to a plaintiff to litigate the rights of third parties when a
violation of those rights would directly affect the litigant and would indi-
rectly affect a third party's rights.27 Secondly, courts may grant standing to
litigate third party rights if the challenged practice affects a close relation-
ship between the litigant and the third party whose rights are raised.28
Thirdly, a court may grant standing to a litigant if the third party has some
18. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (plaintiffs were
denied standing when they failed to show that denial of hospital services was not traceable
to IRS Revenue Ruling that allegedly encouraged denial of services to indigents).
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). For a brief summary of this case, see
note 33 infra.
20. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978)
(plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act encour-
aging the development of nuclear energy since they were able to show that they had suffered
immediate adverse effects from the thermal pollution of two lakes in the vicinity).
21. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer's interest in federal spending
too remote and indefinite to allow him to attack such measures).
22. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (doctor denied standing when he sought
declaratory relief that a state ban on contraceptives violated his patients' constitutional
rights).
23. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
(plaintiffs, sellers of data processing service, had standing to challenge a ruling by the Comp-
troller of Currency that permitted national banks to make data processing services available
to other banks since plaintiffs were able to show economic injury).
24. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). But see Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 n.25 (1978), wherein the
Court notes that there is some disagreement over whether the nexus test is constitutionally
mandated or a prudential limitation.
25. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
26. For a discussion of the first three exceptions, see Comment, Standing and the Propri-
ety of Judicial Intervention: Reviving a Traditional Approach, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 944,
946-51 (1977). For a discussion of the fourth exception, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (officers of a Planned Parenthood
League had standing to assert rights of married persons in general in attacking state law that
banned sale of contraceptives; officers' rights were directly affected because they were being
prosecuted for aiding and abetting the violation of the statute).
28. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Society of Sisters had standing to
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serious obstacle to standing and cannot assert his own right.2 9 Fourthly,
Congress may, by legislation, grant an express right of action to persons
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.3" While pru-
dential requirements may thus be abrogated if the courts so decide, in no
event can the constitutional limitations be circumvented. 3'
In recent years, the question of standing has become more important
because the courts have relied increasingly on standing to narrow the
scope of federal jurisdiction.32 One of the most important recent decisions
to apply standing narrowly and thereby deny access to the courts is Warth
v. Seldin,33 in which the Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs be-
cause they lacked a sufficient stake in the outcome to invoke federal juris-
diction.34 Warth requires a plaintiff to "allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he person-
ally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' intervention" in order
to be granted standing.35 The present status of the "actual injury to plain-
tiff's interest" test as set out in War/h, however, is uncertain. In Village of
challenge state law that required parents and guardians to send all school-age children to
public schools in district in which they resided).
29. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (white litigant had standing to sue for
violation of constitutional rights of black third party who was trying to purchase real estate
from litigant, since third party's rights would otherwise go unvindicated).
30. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (tenants in complex
that was discriminating in rental of apartments had standing to sue as indirect victims under
§ 810 of the Fair Housing Act). See generally Note, Implying Standing to Suefrom Statutory
Authority." Applicability of a "Fair Reading" Standard, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 102 (1978).
31. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
32. See Blum, The New Criteria For Standing in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, II SUF-
FOLK L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, supra note 26, at 945. See also Comment, Standing- A
Key to Flexible Jurisdiction-The Aftermath of Warth v. Seldin, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1247, 1276
(1977), regarding the court's selective use of standing, in which the author stated:
An examination of similar fact situations in recent cases, in which standing
has been granted in one instance and denied in another, compels the conclu-
sion that, in its most controversial applications, standing is employed by the
Court to rationalize a grant or denial of jurisdiction after the Court has reached
a decision on the merits. When the Court has perceived an urgent need to
intervene, it has managed to adjust its standing requirements to grant review.
Flast v. Cohen is the most striking example; Roe v. Wade and Baker v. Carr
are others. Conversely, when a compelling need to intervene is not perceived,
standing proves to be a flexible tool to control and limit jurisdiction. Given
the Court's view of its restrictive role, it is not surprising that abstentions
predominate.
(Emphasis in the original.)
33. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Three groups of plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976), which is part of the Civil Rights Act of1866, wherein all citizens are guaranteed the
right to buy, sell, and own real and personal property. The suit was brought against the
incorporated town of Penfield, New York, alleging that the town's restrictive single-family
unit zoning policy effectively excluded persons of low and moderate incomes. The Court
denied standing in Warth based on both constitutional limitations and prudential considera-
tions.
34. 422 U.S. at 508.
35. Id. (emphasis in the original). Commentators reacted with concern that the Wrarth
decision signaled a new means for the courts to avoid consideration of suits on broad public
issues. See Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine.- Return to Judicial
Supremacy?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467, 467 (1976), expressing apprehension that "the Court
may now be prepared to make judicial economy an ultimate criterion for 'awarding' stand-
ing, a suggestion that provides ample cause for alarm."
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Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.36 the Court
applied the Warth test to an individual plaintiff under facts similar to
those in Warth,37 but reached an opposite conclusion. The Court held that
the plaintiff had demonstrated a sufficient personal stake in the contro-
versy to assert his right to be free of arbitrary zoning practices. 38 Com-
mentators differ as to whether Arlington Heights applied the same strict
standard as Warth. One writer has argued that the same standard was
applied and that the difference in results was attributable to greater speci-
ficity in pleading in Arlington Heights,3 9 while a second writer has argued
that Arlington Heights is a relaxation of the Warth test.4" Regardless of the
precise nature of the test, stricter requirements of standing have enabled
courts to limit the scope of their jurisdiction and thereby avoid deciding a
case on its merits.4 '
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. General Background
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, 42 which prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and sex in the
36. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a
nonprofit housing developer, was interested in constructing a racially integrated, low-to-
moderate-cost housing project. MHDC requested Arlington Heights to rezone the project
site from a single-family to a multiple-family designation. The village denied the request for
rezoning, whereupon the development corporation and three potential residents brought
suit, alleging violations of, inter alia, the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act.
The Supreme Court held that MHDC had no racial identity and was therefore not a direct
target of the alleged discrimination. The Court avoided deciding whether such circum-
stances would bar MHDC from asserting the constitutional rights of its prospective minority
tenants, since one individual plaintiff did have standing to sue. This individual demon-
strated a sufficient injury in fact in that his search for housing near his employment had been
hindered by the village s refusal to change the zoning and allow the project to be built. Id.
at 264.
37. While the fact situations in Warth and Arlington Heights were similar, plaintiffs in
Warth brought their suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1976), whereas plaintiffs in Arling-
ton Heights alleged violations of the fourteenth amendment and § 804 of the Federal Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights remanded on the
statutory question of whether there had been a violation of § 804 since the court of appeals
did not decide this question.
38. 429 U.S. at 264. But see Note, Standing and Equal Protection.: What One Gives the
Other TakesAway, 23 LOYOLA L. REV. 1067, 1073 n.44 (1977), in which the author contends
that the alleged injury held sufficient for standing in Arlington Heights is no more specific
than the injury alleged in Warth.
39. See Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and a Reluctant Supreme Court, 13 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 107, 121 (1977), viewing Arlington Heights as following Warth's strict standard,
thus narrowing the concept of standing and blocking most zoning challenges before they can
be decided on the merits.
40. See Note, supra note 38, at 1072, in which the author contends that Arlington
Heights demonstrates the Supreme Court's intent to relax Warth's stringent requirements.
41. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975), in which Justice Douglas stated in his
dissent that the case should be decided on its merits and that standing should not be a
barrier to the dispensing of justice. See also Note, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp..: Exclusionary Zoning--Constitutional Classism and Racism,
21 How. L.J. 256, 264 (1978).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976).
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sale, rental, financing, or brokerage of housing.43 Instead of relegating en-
forcement of the Act to the Secretary of Housing & Urban Development
(HUD), Congress provided for private individuals to enforce the rights
granted by the Act' by action under one of two enforcement provisions of
the Act: either section 8104" or section 812.46
Section 810 provides for a combined administrative and judicial review
of a complaint filed by a "person aggrieved."47 The initial complaint is
filed as an administrative matter with the Secretary of HUD.48 If the Sec-
retary's efforts at conciliation between the parties are ineffective,49 the
43. Id. §§ 3604-3606. Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in sale or rental of housing,
§ 3605 in financing of housing, and § 3606 in provision of brokerage services.
44. See Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972), in which
Justice Douglas reasoned that private attorneys general suits were virtually the only means
of enforcement of the Act and therefore were needed to protect against indirect as well as
direct harm. See also Note, Third Party Suits Under Section 3612 of the Fair HousingAct of
1968, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 337, 344 (1977).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976) provides:
(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory hous-
ing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discrimi-
natory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter "person aggrieved")
may file a complaint with the Secretary .... Within thirty days after receiv-
ing a complaint, or within thirty days after the expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall investigate
the complaint and give notice in writing to the person aggrieved whether he
intends to resolve it. If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint, he shall
proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing prac-
tice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary or
within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection
(c) of this section, the Secretary has been unable to obtain voluntary compli-
ance with this subchapter, the person aggrieved may, within thirty days there-
after, commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court,
against the respondent named in the complaint, to enforce the rights granted
or protected by this subchapter, insofar as such rights relate to the subject of
the complaint. . . . Such actions may be brought without regard to the
amount in controversy in any United States district court for the district in
which the discriminatory housing practice is alleged to have occurred or be
about to occur or in which the respondent resides or transacts business.
46. Id. § 3612 provides:
(a) The rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606 of this title
may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts
without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or local
courts of general jurisdiction. A civil action shall be commenced within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice oc-
curred: Provided, however, that the court shall continue such civil case
brought pursuant to this section or section 3610(d) of this title from time to
time before bringing it to trial if the court believes that the conciliation efforts
of the Secretary or a State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory
settlement of the discriminatory housing ractice complained of in the com-
plaint made to the Secretary or to the localor State agency and which practice
forms the basis for the action in court . . ..
47. Id. § 3610. For the definition of "person aggrieved," see note 45 supra.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
49. Id. The Act does not specify what constitutes an ineffective effort at conciliation,
which may cause problems for parties filing under § 810. One author argued:
It may seem less unfair to demand that complainant pursue the remedial proc-
ess he has himself chosen. However, requiring an actual attempt at concilia-
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complainant is free to proceed to federal court for a judicial resolution."
Section 812 differs from section 810 in that it does not require a com-
plainant initially to seek relief through the administrative process; rather,
it allows the complainant direct access to the federal courts.5 ' Section 812
does not use the language of "person aggrieved" as found in section 810,52
however, and this omission creates confusion as to whether these two sec-
tions apply to the same class of plaintiffs. While the early cases con-
fronting this problem held that sections 810 and 812 provided alternative
procedures for those who had been directly injured,53 it was unclear
whether individuals sustaining indirect injuries had standing to sue under
either section.
B. Persons Aggrieved
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 4 the Supreme Court
for the first time focused on the issue of standing for indirect victims of
violations of the Fair Housing Act. The Court held that, even though
complainants were already tenants in an apartment that was practicing
discrimination in its rental policies, they still had standing to sue under
section 810 as indirect victims in that they had lost the social, business, and
professional benefits of living in an integrated community. 5 The Court
resolved the issue of whether these alleged injuries were intended to be
protected by section 810 by broadly construing the term "person ag-
tion makes it impossible for the complainant in deciding whether to resort to
the Secretary to calculate how long the process of conciliation might take. The
complainant and the Secretary may well disagree over whether conciliation
has failed. If the Secretary is given control over this determination and, hence,
over the complainant's access to court, complainants will avoid the agency
conciliation remedy, and the interest in voluntary compliance evidenced in
title VIII will suffer.
Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing.- Private Enforcement Provisions of the
Civil RightsAct of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 850 (1969).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1976) provides that such actions may be brought without re-
gard to the amount in controversy.
51. See note 46 supra.
52. See note 45 supra.
53. See Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp.
486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County
Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976).
54. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Trafficante was originally filed by two tenants under §§ 810 &
812, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976). Intervenors subsequently joined the action, one of
whom filed under § 812. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1161 n.5
(9th Cir. 1971). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which held that none of the
laintiffs had standing. The Supreme Court reversed, focusing on § 810 and mentioning
812 without distinguishing it. Two district court cases interpreted the Court's action in
Trafficante as approving standing for indirect victims under § 812. Wheatley Heights
Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Fair
Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 1071, 1082 (D.N.J. 1976). Two authors, however, contended that the Court
denied standing under § 812 in Trafficante. Note, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.:
Wfhite Ghetto Tenants-Standing to Protest Landlord's Rental Discrimination, 22 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 359 (1973); Note, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Lfe. Standing Under the Civil Rights
Act, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 539, 541 (1973).
55. 409 U.S. at 208.
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grieved" 56 to include any person suffering injuries under the Fair Housing
Act, regardless of whether he was a direct or indirect victim.5 7 Despite the
Court's unambiguous holding in Traficante that section 810 covered both
direct and indirect victims, it remained unclear whether that holding ap-
plied to section 812 as well.
8
C. Post-Traficante Developments
Although two district courts59 in cases subsequent to Trajjicante applied
its rationale to section 812, concluding that section 812 gave standing to
indirect victims suffering injuries under the Act, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed. In TOPIC v. Circle Realty6 ° the court held that one
claiming to be an indirect victim under the Act did not have standing to
sue under section 812. The court relied on what it referred to as the nar-
rower language of section 812; this section does not use the broad term
"person aggrieved," nor does it require an exhaustion of administrative
procedures or state or local remedies as does section 810.61 Thus, the court
reasoned that, since section 812 provides for immediate access to the
courts, that section must be interpreted as providing a remedy only to
those suffering immediate direct harm from discriminatory practices.
62
III. GLADSTONE, REALTORS V. VILLAGE OF BELLWOOD
In Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors63 the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that section 812 extends standing to indirect victims of racial dis-
crimination, a result contrary to the Ninth Circuit holding in TOPIC. To
resolve the intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear Gladstone. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell 64 affirmed the
56. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV.
255, 257-58 (1961), noting various interpretations of "person aggrieved" at common law.
57. The Court relied heavily on Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971),
which held that a former employee could assert the rights of a present employee under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, which allows suits by "persons claiming to be
aggrieved.' The Court also relied heavily on the fact that HUD had treated plaintiffs as
"persons aggrieved" within the meaning of § 810, stating that "such construction is entitled
to great weight." 409 U.S. at 209.
58. Several intervening plaintiffs asserted standing under § 812 but not § 810. The
Court focused exclusively on § 810 in reaching its holding and failed to clarify whether there
was standing under § 812 as well, thus causing subsequent confusion in cases that followed
Trafficante.
59. See Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp.
486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County
Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976).
60. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
61. 532 F.2d at 1275-76.
62. Id.
63. 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978).
64. It is interesting to note that Justice Powell has written the opinions for all of the
recent important standing cases. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also Powell's concurrence in Trafficante,
wherein Powell concurs that he would not have found standing to sue but for the statute.
409 U.S. at 212.
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Seventh Circuit, approving the broader construction of section 812.65
First, the Court looked to the statute to determine if section 812 was in-
tended to include indirect victims of discriminatory practices within its
scope.66 In determining that respondents had standing to sue under the
statute, the Court examined the statutory language and found unconvinc-
ing the defendants' argument that section 812 should be construed more
narrowly than section 810 because it does not contain the broad term "per-
son aggrieved."67 The Court reasoned that this omission was of little sig-
nificance since the grammatical construction of the sentence, specifically,
the use of the passive voice, obviated the need for a direct reference to
potential plaintiffs.68
Secondly, the Court sought to ascertain the congressional intent in en-
acting the statute.69 Although the legislative history of the Act does not
squarely address the issue of standing,7" the Court found various indica-
tions that Congress intended sections 810 and 812 to be alternative reme-
dies.7 Not only did the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee view
the two sections as alternative remedies,72 but HUD had also consistently
treated them as such.73 Additionally, the early fair housing legislative pro-
posals provided only for civil suits as the method of enforcement.7" The
administrative remedy was added later, apparently as a more expeditious
and less burdensome alternative for complainants.75 The Court therefore
concluded that, in the absence of specific evidence to support the argument
65. 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979).
66. Id. at 1608-13, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 77-82.
67. Id. at 1609, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 78.
68. Id. This hardly seems to be conclusive since the use of the passive voice in no way
rules out the use of "person aggrieved." Even given this grammatical construction, Congress
could have easily included "person aggrieved" in § 812.
69. Id. at 1611-12, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 80-81.
70. Id. at 1611, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 80. See Dubofsky, Fair Housing.4 Legislative History
anda Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1969), in which the author indicates that the
vote by the House to accept the Senate amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (which
included § 812) was due principally to the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King. The Congres-
sional Record reveals that several House members were upset with the cursory handling of
H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Representative Latta argued that the House was
"being forced to act in haste." 114 CONG. REC. 9566 (1968). See also Crim v. Glover, 338 F.
Supp. 823, 826 (S.D. Ohio 1972), in which the court stated: "The Act was debated, as H.R.
2516, on the floor of the House of Representatives and passed in the wake of the assassina-
tion of the Rev. Martin Luther King. As to be expected, floor debate was more emotive than
clarifying."
71. 99 S. Ct. at 1611-12, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 80-82.
72. 114 CONG. REC. 9560 (1968), wherein Representative Celler stated: "In addition to
administrative remedies, the bill authorizes immediate civil suits by private persons ...."
73. 99 S. Ct. at 1612, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 81. See 24 C.F.R. § 105.16(a) (1978), wherein the
regulations provide that every "person aggrieved shall be notified of... his right to bring
court action under sections 810 and 812.'
74. Three bills that contained fair housing provisions were introduced in Congress in
1966: S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 14770, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R.
14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). All three bills provided for judicial enforcement only.
75. 112 CONG. REC. 18402 (1968), wherein Representative Conyers stated: "Experience
with comparable State and local agencies repeatedly has shown that the administrative proc-
ess is quicker and fairer. It more quickly implements the rights of the persons discriminated
against and also quickly resolves frivolous and otherwise invalid complaints."
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that section 812 contemplated a more restricted class of plaintiffs, the
Court should not read that restriction into the statute.76
Having determined that respondents had standing to sue under the Act,
the Court then turned to a consideration of the constitutional limitations
and concluded that respondents' allegations satisfied the distinct and pal-
pable injury requirement of article 111. 7 7 In contrast to its earlier decision
in Trafficante, the Court thoroughly examined the question of injury in
fact. As to the village of Bellwood, the Court held that defendants' steer-
ing practices might well affect property values that in turn would directly
injure a municipality by diminishing its tax base.78 Additionally, the
Court held that the loss of racial balance and stability in a particular geo-
graphic location was sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement of article
III and to confer standing on the village.79 The Court concluded that the
loss of social and professional benefits satisfied the injury requirement as
to the individuals, as did the diminution of value of the individual plain-
tiffs' homes as a result of the illegal steering.
80
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented and reached the
same conclusion as the TOPIC court that section 812 should be construed
more narrowly than section 810.81 The dissent's argument differed from
the TOPIC opinion, however, in that the dissent would hold that, while
the article III requirement had been met in Gladstone,82 the statutory re-
quirements had not.83 Thus, the dissent would hold that the plaintiffs
should be denied standing based on prudential principles. 84 The dissent
relied both on the plain meaning of the statute and on the structural argu-
ment that different remedies available under the two sections are evidence
that Congress would not set up a specific administrative scheme and, at the
same time, allow complainants to bypass the procedure completely under a
separate enforcement section.85 This argument apparently ignores the fact
that swift action might be more easily attained through HUD, rather than
the federal courts, even though section 814 provides for speedy handling of
all suits brought under the Fair Housing Act. Furthermore, the dissent
noted that broader relief is available under section 812.86 Plaintiffs may be
76. 99 S. Ct. at 1611-13, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 80-82.
77. Id. at 1613-16, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 82-86.
78. Id. at 1613, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 83.
79. Id. at 1614, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 84; see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977), in which the Court recognized the importance of promoting
stable and racially integrated housing.
80. 99 S. Ct. at 1614-16, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 84-86; see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972), in which the Court held such allegations sufficient to satisfy
constitutional limits of standing.
81. 99 S. Ct. at 1622, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 94; see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 1618-19, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 89-90.
83. The court in TOPIC expressed doubt whether constitutional limitations had been
satisfied, but did not reach the issue because of its holding that the statutory limitations had
not been satisfied. 532 F.2d at 1275.
84. 99 S. Ct. at 1619, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 90-9 1. For a discussion of prudential principles,
see text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 1620-22, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 91-94.
86. Id. at 1621, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 92.
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awarded both injunctive relief and monetary damages, as well as court
costs and attorneys' fees. Such broad relief, the dissent reasoned, should
be reserved for direct victims of discrimination.87 Finally, the dissent ex-
amined and rejected plaintiffs' claim of standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,88
holding that they had failed to demonstrate a racially motivated interfer-
ence with property rights.89
The Court's interpretation of section 812 will have far-reaching effects.9"
As a result of the Gladstone decision indirect victims of housing discrimi-
nation, such as those who have been denied the advantage of living in an
integrated society, now have immediate access to the federal courts, which
could prove to be a formidable weapon. An alleged violator, instead of
facing the more informal administrative procedure, can now be faced im-
mediately with a lawsuit brought by an indirect victim, which will impose
expense and require effort on his part. The defendant will of course need
to retain counsel, and he quickly can be subjected to the full discovery
process. Whereas the violator faces these same burdens under section 810,
he is first given a chance to comply with the Act before suit can be filed
against him. While the majority in Gladstone dismisses the possibility that
complainants might use section 812 for harassment, that possibility is
clearly present.
Another result of Gladstone may be the increased use of testers to prove
racial discrimination in subsequent suits. While the decision has already
been heralded as making it much easier to use testing techniques to build
cases against realtors,9 ' Gladstone does not give standing to testers in their
capacity as testers; rather, testers may have standing, but only if they are
able to fulfill the case or controversy requirement of article 111.92 If a tester
cannot show such an injury, he does not have standing. 93 The Court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether a tester living outside of an affected
area has standing to sue under section 812.9' Thus, this matter remains for
future decisions to resolve.
Most significantly, Gladstone indicates that the Supreme Court is using a
broader approach to standing than that taken in Warth v. Seldin. Warth
has been viewed as "the watershed case in the law of standing,"95 which
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .. to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."
89. 99 S. Ct. at 1622, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 94. The plaintiffs had sought standing under
§ 1982, but since standing was granted under § 812 there was no reason for the Court to
reach the § 1982 argument. Id. at 1616 n.33.
90. For example, based on the holding in Gladstone, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district
court opinion in which standing to sue had been denied to a nonprofit corporation that sued
a real estate firm allegedly engaged in racial steering. Broadmoor Improvement Ass'n v.
Weber & Assocs., 597 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1979).
91. WG&L Real Estate Outlook, 1979, at 12, col. 3.
92. 99 S. Ct. at 1614 n.25, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 84 n.25.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see note 9 supra.
95. See Blum, supra note 32, at 10.
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might signal an end to federal adjudication of all cases involving genera-
lized or indirect injury and might indicate that access to courts to vindicate
constitutional rights depends on judicial favor rather than on constitu-
tional rule.9 6 The Court's opinion in Gladstone is a clear indication that
neither a rigid view of statutory construction nor the placement of heavy
burdens on those seeking to show injury in fact will be used invariably to
preclude review of controversial cases on their merits. Whereas either stat-
utory standing or constitutional limitations could have been used as "a
precision instrument of subtle judicial activism, cutting off at the threshold
the very possibility of asserting major constitutional rights,"97 the Supreme
Court liberally interpreted the statute and did not strictly scrutinize the
causal nexus between the action of the defendant and the injury. Thus, the
court allowed the village of Bellwood and its residents to reach the sub-
stantive issue of discriminatory practices affecting the area. While Glad-
stone primarily involves the interpretation of one statutory provision in
the Fair Housing Act, on a broader level it seems to signal that the alarm
caused by the possible repercussion of Warth was unfounded. It is signifi-
cant to note that had the dissent prevailed the concern that standing is
being used by the courts to avoid controversial issues would have been
justified; only by applying the broader interpretation of standing was the
Supreme Court able to allow an issue of vital social importance to be
reached.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, suits by private individ-
uals have been the primary means of enforcement to end racial discrimina-
tion in housing. In Trafficante the Supreme Court recognized the right of
individuals to assert injuries as indirect victims under section 810, thus
broadening the class of plaintiffs who have standing to sue under that sec-
tion. In Gladstone the Supreme Court continued the line of reasoning be-
gun in Trafficante by holding that individuals asserting injuries as indirect
victims had standing to sue under section 812 as well, thereby providing
immediate access to the federal courts for all parties affected by racially
discriminatory housing practices. The Gladstone decision therefore should
have an impact on facilitating the ultimate goal of the Fair Housing Act, to
end racial discrimination in the housing market nationwide. On a broader
level, the case expresses a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to
confront issues of great social importance rather than to use standing as a
barrier to preclude their consideration. Although the Court in Gladstone
was presented with plausible arguments for denying standing, it instead
granted standing, thus enabling the lower court to reach the merits of a
case raising a controversial social issue. Such a posture could well indicate
96. See Broderick, supra note 35, at 467.
97. See id.
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